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Abstract 
Since the end of World War II, Muslim countries have been plagued by sixteen major wars, many coups, 
political, religious and ethnic insurgency, and revolutions. While many developing countries in south-
east Asia have emerged as developed economy in this time period, in spite of having sufficient natural 
resources, most of the Muslim countries are still fighting with higher inflation, unemployment, poverty, 
inequality, poor healthcare, illiteracy, and rampant corruption. This paper studies how political stability 
affects growth in OIC countries by using relatively advanced dynamic GMM and simultaneous quantile 
regression. It is found that political stability has significant positive effect on growth. The impact of 
political stability on economic growth is more important for lower income countries than higher income 
countries. Most of the low to mid income oil dependent OIC countries suffer from chronic misery, 
higher inflation and persistent unemployment, which has significant negative effect on growth. Oil 
revenue plays a major role in economic growth for both OIC and Non-OIC oil dependent developing 
countries. The importance of political stability, economic diversification and macroeconomic stability 
has been restated with policy recommendations for oil dependent developing countries in general and 
OIC countries in particular.  
 
Keywords: political stability, economic growth, misery index, oil rent, OIC countries, dynamic GMM, 
Quantile regression
                                                             
1Md Akther Uddin, Graduate student in Islamic finance at INCEIF, Lorong Universiti A, 59100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  
2 Corresponding author, Professor of Finance and Econometrics, INCEIF, Lorong Universiti A, 59100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Phone: +60173841464 Email: mansurmasih@inceif.org 
 War and peace: why is political stability pivotal for economic growth of OIC countries? 
 
Introduction 
Muslim countries have been plagued by sixteen major wars, many coups, political, religious and 
ethnic insurgency, and revolutions since World War II. 3  Intense political instability, economic and 
political repression, chronic unemployment could trigger many Arab springs like revolutions in many 
OIC countries. Is political instability a new phenomenon for Muslim world?  The answer is obviously 
no. The importance of political stability for greater human welfare has been repeatedly mentioned in the 
Holy Quran and tradition of the Prophet (PBUH). Therefore, theoretical underpinnings of political 
stability and growth lie in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. 
One of the brightest mind in early Islamic period, Ibn Khaldun (Khaldūn, Rosenthal, & Dawood, 
1969) states that political instability adversely affects economic growth. He argues that political stability 
creates a favorable environment for business to flourish, create employment opportunities and migration 
into the cities which increase demand and stimulate economic growth. This could certainly be 
considered as one of the first foundational theories of Islamic political economy.  
Political instability is defined as the propensity of a government collapse (Alesina, Özler, 
Roubini, & Swagel, 1996). This could be either because of conflicts or rampant competition between 
various political parties. Also, the occurrence of a government change increases the likelihood of 
subsequent changes. Political instability tends to be persistent. 
According to the political theories of Max Weber, political stability depends on the government's 
legitimate use of physical force. Political instability is associated with the concept of a failed state 
(Mommsen, 1992). Mancur Olson’s influential The Rise and Decline of Nations stressed the importance 
of institutional and political factors in explaining differences in rates of economic growth. 
Barro (1991) in his classic work argue that political instability and growth are negatively 
correlated. Fosu (1992) studied political instability, instability of governments, regimes, and 
communities within a nation, and growth in sub-Saharan African countries and found adverse impact of 
political instability on economic growth. Alesina et al., (1996) found that countries with higher political 
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 instability, the propensity to change government is high, suffer lower growth. In other words, political 
stability and economic growth are deeply interconnected. In their more recent work, Aisen and Veiga 
found positive association between higher political instability and higher inflation (Aisen & Veiga, 
2013). 
On the other hand, there are studies which did not find any significant relationship between 
political stability and growth. Although Goldsmith did not find statistically significant relationship 
between political instability and growth but he acknowledged the limitations of his methodology used in 
the study and shortage of reliable data on growth in the period of study(Goldsmith, 1987). In another 
study, Londregan and Poole (1989) did not find evidence of lower growth as a consequence of increased 
political instability; instead, they argue that low economic growth increases the probability of political 
instability. Devereux & Wen (1998) investigated the impact of political instability on economic growth 
in 52 countries by using the averages of 1960–1985 and found that political stability had negative impact 
on economic growth. 
The importance of political stability for sustainable economic development is questionable in 
current conventional literature, however, Islamic paradigm of economic thought urge to maintain 
political stability in order to avoid detrimental socio-economic consequences. Not surprisingly, six 
Muslim countries were ranked at the top 6 of the Economist Political Instability Index in 2009. There are 
very few research on theoretical understanding of this issue in OIC countries.  
Gurr, Woodward, Marshall, & Force (2005) study political instability in Muslim countries and 
found that 54 cases of political instability in Muslim countries between 1955 and 2003. Armah (2009) 
investigate political stability and economic growth found that political stability is significantly related to 
growth  for thirty one Sub-Saharan African countries from 1984-2007. Ahmed & Pulok (2013) study the 
direct impact of political stability on economic performance of Bangladesh for the period of 1984 -2009 
and found that political stability has negative effect in the long run while the short run effect is positive. 
Tang & Abosedra (2014) study impact of political instability on economic growth in MENA countries  
for the period of 2001 to 2009 found that political instability hinders growth and development in MENA 
region. Mohamed Masry (2015) study political stability and growth in Egypt after January 2011 
revolution by developing two political instability index and applying model used by Aisen & Veiga 
(2013). He finds that political instability negatively affect growth and economic development in Egypt 
in the study period.  
 According to the literature, a good number of studies have been carried out in the last three 
decades to understand the relationship between political stability and growth. Although theoretical 
foundation has been strengthened, but the lack of appropriate variable to measure political stability gives 
conflicting empirical findings. The use of econometric methods also varied across the study, from 
ordinary least squares, times series co-integration to advanced panel techniques.  
Analysis of empirical literature indicates that different studies applied different indicators to 
measure political stability, with the availability of data from Heritage Foundation, index of economic 
freedom, encourage several studies to reinvestigate the relationship between political stability and 
growth. Most of the previous studies did not consider political stability as a focus variable so did not do 
extensive literature review and analytical framework.  In our study we use two indicators of political 
stability: political stability index4 by Heritage Foundation and political risk index by Oxford economics.  
Moreover, economic growth is measured by the natural log of the per capita real GDP constant 2005 $. 
To test our hypothesis of whether political stability affect growth, we apply advanced dynamic system 
GMM. This estimator handles important modeling concerns, namely the fixed effects and endogeneity 
of regressors, whilst avoiding dynamic panel bias. We apply this estimator on a unbalanced panel data 
set comprising 16 oil dependent OIC countries5 by taking 4-year average data over the period 1996-
2014. When there are evidences of outliers and heavy tailed distributions, quantile regression results are 
characteristically robust for such cases but standard OLS regression estimators are not robust even to the 
modest departure from normality. Consequently, simultaneous quantile regression has been applied to 
see the impact of political stability on growth for countries with different levels of economic 
development.  
The results show that political stability has significant positive effect on economic growth even 
controlling for other key macroeconomic variables. The impact of political stability on economic growth 
is more important for lower income countries than higher income countries. Most of the low to mid 
income oil dependent OIC countries suffer from chronic higher inflation and unemployment and 
consequently it has significant negative effect on growth. Oil revenue plays a major role in economic 
growth of oil dependent developing countries both OIC and Non-OIC. The importance of political 
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 stability, economic diversification and macroeconomic stability has been restated with policy 
recommendations for oil dependent developing countries in general and OIC countries in particular.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature. The theoretical model specification, data and the econometric methodology are 
explained in section 3. The empirical results and discussions are presented in section 4. The last section 
ends with the concluding remarks and policy implications.  
Political stability in Islam 
Allah (SWT) mentions in the Glorious Quran: 
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. 
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.6 [The Quran, 4:59] 
This verse is one of the fundamental principles of religious, social, cultural and political life in 
Islam. One of the significant lessons from this verse is obeying the leader in power right after Allah and 
His Messenger Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). There are also numerous Hadiths on this regard. Even 
though as Muslim we must accept the Quranic injunction without any doubt in our mind, however, our 
inquisitive mind wants to investigate the rationality behind this revelation. While discussing different 
Quranic interpretations, Muhammad Rafique (2015) argues that following the leader would ensure 
stable law and order, political stability, protect countries from foreign aggression, and ensure peace and 
prosperity. The consequence of recent Arab uprising is evident to us and post revolutionary situation 
clearly restates that this has not only destabilized the political stability but also economic development 
in those countries. But however, silence against brutal dictator who does not uphold Islamic values is 
also not acceptable. Even in this situation uprising is not recommended in Islam rather concerted 
counseling is recommended as insurgency may create not only disorder but also unnecessary blood-
shed. In another verse Allah(SWT) says: 
…fitnah is worse than killing….7[The Quran, 2:191] 
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 Here, the word fitnah means confusing state or corruption. In this way, Islam clearly prohibits 
social disorder, arm revolution, political instability and corruption.   
One of the brightest mind in early Islamic period, Ibn Khaldun (Khaldūn et al., 1969) states that 
political instability adversely affects economic growth. He argues that political stability creates a 
favorable environment for business to flourish, create employment opportunities and migration into the 
cities which increase demand and stimulate economic growth. This could certainly be considered as one 
of the first foundational theories of political stability and economic growth from Islamic economics 
perspeective.  
M. Umer Chapra argues that ongoing revival of Islam may make it possible to have material 
advance accompanied by moral uplift, justice and social harmony, which are important for providing the 
needed social and ethical capital for sustained development (Chapra, 2008). 
Based on the above revelations and arguments we can state that Islam is a religion of peace and 
prosperity, moreover, which encourage political stability for greater welfare of human being. In the 
following section, a review of literature on political stability and growth is going to be discussed. 
Political stability and growth 
According to the political theories of Max Weber, political stability depends on the government's 
legitimate use of physical force. If the government cannot ensure the basic services it provides for 
people, such as security and the possibility of procuring food and shelter, it loses the power to enforce 
laws and political instability ensues. Political instability is associated with the concept of a failed state 
(Mommsen, 1992). 
Mancur Olson’s influential The Rise and Decline of Nations stressed the importance of 
institutional and political factors in explaining differences in rates of economic growth. Goldsmith 
summarizes Olson’s theory as follows: 
Olson's theory implies that political stability and instability are dichotomous: instability must 
reach a threshold to disrupt distributional coalitions. Lesser degrees of instability may not trigger 
this effect at all. The discontinuous character of stability suggests a fourfold typology of political 
systems. Each type is expected to have a characteristic growth pattern: (1) The Chronically 
Unstable states should exhibit persistently slow growth. (2) The Consistently Stable ones should 
 grow relatively quickly but show a declining trend over time. (3) The Stabilizing political 
systems that are settling into a new pattern of political order should under go a spurt in growth 
rate. (4) Finally, there are regimes that are becoming less stable. Olson does not make an explicit 
prediction about these Destabilizing systems, but the inference is that their growth rates would 
drop sharply. 
Political instability is defined as the propensity of a government collapse (Alesina et al., 1996). 
This could be either because of conflicts or rampant competition between various political parties. Also, 
the occurrence of a government change increases the likelihood of subsequent changes. Political 
instability tends to be persistent. 
The Economist (2009) defines political instability as those events or developments that pose a 
serious extra-parliamentary or extra-institutional threat to governments or the existing political order. 
The events will almost invariably be accompanied by some violence as well as public disorder. These 
need not necessarily succeed in toppling a government or regime. Even unsuccessful episodes result in 
turmoil and serious disruption. 
Barro (1991) in his classic work argue that political instability and growth are negatively 
correlated, in his study he measured political instability two ways: first, number of revolutions and 
coups per year and second, number per million population of political assassinations per year and he 
found both of these variables were significantly negative for growth. He argued that these variables 
adversely affect property rights and thereby as negative influences on investment and growth. However, 
he stated that this relationship may reflect a positive influence of growth on political stability than vice-
versa. 
Fosu (1992) studied political instability, instability of governments, regimes, and communities 
within a nation, and growth in sub-Saharan African countries. By using OLS regression the author found 
adverse impact of political instability on economic growth. The direct effect of high political instability 
in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated as approximately a 1.1 percent point reduction in annual growth 
controlling for capital, labor and exports. 15 OIC member states were included in this study and 7 of 
them were classified as high political instability category, namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda. 
 Alesina et al., (1996) in their seminal work studied political instability and growth in a sample of 
113 countries for the period of 1950-1982 and found that countries with higher political instability, the 
propensity to change government is high, suffer lower growth. In other words, political stability and 
economic growth are deeply interconnected. Unstable political environment may reduce investment 
activities and the growth, conversely, poor economic performance may lead to government collapse and 
political unrest. However, they also found that low economic growth does not affect political instability.  
By applying three-stage least-squares estimation data covering ninety-six countries for the period 
of 1960 to 1980, Feng found that political instability and growth are negatively correlated. Moreover, 
the study showed that democracy has a significant and positive effect on economic growth by inhibiting 
regime interruption and enhancing system adjustability (Feng, 1997). 
Economic growth is found to be positively impacted by political stability in OECD countries for 
the period of 2003-2007 with the help of panel least squares estimations and panel two-stage least 
squares estimations (Cebula, 2011). 
In their more recent work, Aisen and Veiga found positive association between higher political 
instability and higher inflation by using advanced panel data econometric technique, system GMM, on 
100 countries for the period of 1960- 1999; it was also found that the impact of political instability on 
inflation is much stronger for high inflation than for moderate and low inflation countries, and also for 
developing than for industrial countries. Moreover, higher degree of economic freedom and democracy 
are associated with lower inflation (Aisen & Veiga, 2013). 
Bashir & Xu (2014) study political stability on economic growth in 117 countries during the 
period 1980–2012 by using the Heritage Foundation economic freedom index for economic freedom and 
established a political stability index by using 12 different political risk measures of International 
Country Risk Guide. It is found in the study that political stability and economic freedom have positive 
impact on economic growth. 
Radu (2015) found that political stability plays an important role in Romania’s economic growth 
and argued that stable political environment promotes sustainable economic development. Caporale & 
Leirer (2010) test the Olson superstructure by employing a panel of U.S. state economic growth rates for 
the period 1975–2005 to investigate the relationship between political stability and growth. They find a 
significant, negative relationship between political instability and U.S. state economic growth rates. 
 They argue that higher political turnover (and hence lower expected durability) should be associated 
with more rent-seeking behavior and lower marginal growth rate 
On the other hand, there are studies which did not find any significant relationship between 
political stability and growth. Goldsmith(1987), one of the earlier empirical works to test Mancur 
Olson’s theory, where political instability is treated as exogenous variables in 77 Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) (Goldsmith, 1987).  
Although Goldsmith did not find statistically significant relationship between political instability 
and growth among these four groups but he acknowledged the limitations of his methodology used in 
the study and shortage of reliable data on growth in the period of study.  
In another study, Londregan and Poole (1989) did not find evidence of lower growth as a 
consequence of increased political instability; instead, they argue that low economic growth increases 
the probability of political instability.  
Devereux & Wen (1998) investigate the impact of political instability on economic growth in 52 
countries by using the averages of 1960–1985 and found that political stability had negative impact on 
economic growth. 
From the literature, it is clear that political stability has been treated as an endogenous or 
exogenous variable. Economic growth and political stability are profoundly interconnected. It can be 
argued, on the one hand, that uncertainty associated with an unstable political environment may reduce 
investment and the pace of economic development. On the other hand, poor economic performance may 
lead to government collapse and political unrest.  
According to the literature, a good number of studies have been carried out in the last three 
decades to understand the relationship between political stability and growth. Although theoretical 
foundation has been strengthened, but the lack of appropriate variable to measure political stability gives 
conflicting empirical findings. The use of econometric methods also varied across the study, from 
simply least squares, times series co-integration to advanced panel techniques.  
 
 
 Political stability and growth in Muslim countries 
The importance of political stability for sustainable economic development is questionable but 
Islamic paradigm of economic thought always urge to maintain political stability in order to avoid 
detrimental socio-economic consequences. Very few researches have been conducted on this issue in 
Islamic countries. Many Muslim countries have become independent from colonial power since World 
War II. Since then most of the Muslim countries have been facing political instability in the form of 
regional war, frequent coup d’état, uprising, ethic violence, political insurgency, and revolution.   
Significant wars in Muslim countries since World War II: the First Kashmir War between India and 
Pakistan (1947-1948), first Arab-Israeli War (1948-49), Malayan War(1948-1960), Algerian War of 
Independence (1954-1962), Suez War of 1956, Yemen Civil war( 1962-1970), Second Kashmir War 
(1965), Six-Day War (1967), Bengali War of Independence(1971), Lebanese Civil War (1975), Afghan 
Civil war (1978-Present), Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Israeli Invasion and Occupation of Southern 
Lebanon (1982-2000), Gulf war (1991), American Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the beginning of 
this century. Moreover, the so called Arab springs have erupted in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria 
since 2011. In this background, isn’t it logical to hypothesize that these political uncertainties 
significantly hinder the economic development of Muslim majority countries?   
If we study the empirical literature of political stability and growth in Muslim countries, the 
results are not also convincing. There could be many reasons for not finding conclusive evidence. First 
of all, economic development in OIC countries are not equal for all countries, there are countries with 
higher per capita GDP there are countries with very low per capita GDP, there are countries which rely 
heavily on natural resources, oil and gas, like countries in the Gulf, there are emerging economies like 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey where manufacturing and service sectors have growing faster than 
other countries, there are countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria where political 
instability is comparatively higher than other OIC countries, different types of institutions, government 
structure: democratic, autocratic, monarchy. Financial sectors development is also at different stage of 
development, most of OIC countries do not have well-developed capital market and the economy is 
based on banking system, financial regulation and rule of institutions are also weak, most importantly 
property rights are not ensured due to lack of rule of law. Corruption is rampant across the OIC 
countries except few countries which make these countries very different from other developing or 
 emerging countries. There are seven high income countries in OIC, all of them are GCC countries 
except Brunei Darussalam (("Country and Lending Groups," 2016).  
However, political stability can be achieved through oppression or through having a political 
party in place that does not have to compete to be re-elected. In these cases, political stability is a double 
edged sword. While the peaceful environment that political stability may offer is a desideratum, it could 
easily become a breeding ground for cronyism with impunity. Such is the dilemma that many countries 
with a fragile political order have to face.   
Gurr, Woodward, Marshall, & Force (2005) study political instability in Muslim countries and 
found that 54 cases of political instability in Muslim countries between 1955 and 2003. The rash of new 
events in the early 1990s pushed the proportion of Muslim countries with ongoing state failures over 40 
percent: Political instability was a bigger problem for Muslim countries in the mid 1990s than it ever 
had been. A total of 14 new episodes of political instability occurred in Muslim countries in the 1990s, 
nine in sub-Saharan Africa and four in former communist states. In the late 1990s, there was a sharp 
global decline in both the incidence and prevalence of instability in Muslim countries, as seven episodes 
of instability ended and only one new episode began (Côte d’Ivoire 2002). At year-end 2003, only 16 
percent of Muslim countries were experiencing political instability. 
Adverse regime change—a category that encompasses abrupt declines in the degree of 
democracy, revolutionary changes in political elites, and collapses of central state authority—has been 
the most common type of political instability in Muslim countries, occurring 46 times since 1955. The 
prevalence of this type of event indicates that the fragility of central governments has been a leading 
cause of political crisis in the Muslim world in the past several decades. Revolutionary and ethnic wars 
have also been significant sources of instability, however, occurring 25 and 35 times, respectively, 
during that same period. Fifteen of the 36 incidents of genocide or politicide identified by the Task 
Force also occurred in predominantly Muslim countries. 
Muslim countries were in crisis for roughly one of every four years between 1955 and 2003. This 
prevalence is substantially higher than the approximately one in seven years for the non-Muslim world. 
They argue that the main qualification is that economically advanced, consolidated democracies-
virtually all of them non-Muslim-rarely experience incidents of instability. Moreover, they investigated 
the effects of a set of specifically “Islamic” variables: (1) the degree of allegiance to Shari’ah, or 
 traditional Islamic law, particularly family law or codes of personal status; (2) the presence of Islamist 
ideologies and organizations; and (3) the presence of sectarian groups most Muslims consider to be 
heretical. However, they did not find any relationship between any of these variables and risk of political 
instability. Finally, they concluded that, even though religion clearly is very salient to politics in most 
Muslim countries, the key drivers of political instability in the Muslim world are, in most respects, the 
same as those in the rest of the world. 
Armah (2009) investigate political stability and economic growth by using panel data  and find 
that political stability is significantly related to growth  for thirty one Sub-Saharan African countries 
from 1984-2007.  
Many empirical studies have documented that political instability has a negative impact on major 
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, inflation and private investment (Khan & Saqib, 2011). Ahmed 
& Pulok (2013) study the direct impact of political stability on economic performance of Bangladesh for 
the period of 1984 -2009 by using time series econometric approach and they find that political stability 
has negative effect in the long run while the short run effect is positive. They argue that destabilizing 
events interrupt economic activities in the short term, but these can set the stage for more rapid growth 
in the medium term. Moreover, self-seeking interest group or “distributional coalition” is responsible for 
this kind counter intuitive relationship between political stability and growth. However, they conclude 
that even though political stability is an important precondition of growth for developing countries like 
Bangladesh but it cannot be considered as the key determinant of economic performance.  
Tang & Abosedra (2014) study the impact of political instability on economic growth in MENA 
countries  for the period of 2001 to 2009 by using GMM and find that political instability hinders growth 
and development in MENA region. However, the main focus variables of the study are tourism and 
energy consumption. They argue that poor economic performance of countries in the region for the last 
two decades could be due to unstable political condition. They further state that the region has been 
shaken by violence and political instability for many years and there have been many uprisings since the 
beginning of 2011 seeking more democratic systems which will lead to more political stability in the 
long run.  
Yilmaz & Levent (2015) study the impact of economic freedom, political stability and economic 
policy uncertainty in the United States on economic growth in emerging Asian countries including 
 China, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand during the period 
2002–2013 by using Westerlund’s Durbin-Hausman cointegration tests and Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel 
causality test. They find a bidirectional causality between political stability and economic growth. 
Mohamed Masry (2015) study political stability and growth in Egypt after January 2011 
revolution by developing two political instability index and applying model used by Aisen & Veiga 
(2013). He finds that political instability negatively affect growth and economic development in Egypt 
in the study period.  
Analysis of empirical literature indicates that different studies applied different indicators to 
measure political stability, with the availability of data from Heritage Foundation, index of economic 
freedom, encourage several studies to reinvestigate the relationship between political stability and 
growth. Most of the previous studies did not consider political stability as a focus variable so did not do 
extensive literature review and analytical framework.  Therefore, it is safe to assume that the issue is not 
settled yet and need further empirical investigations.  
 
  
 Data and Empirical model  
Code  
LPC 
 
 
 
 
LPR 
 
 
 
LOR 
 
 
LMI 
 
 
 
LFI 
Description 
Log of Per Capita 
GDP constant USD 
 
 
 
Log of Political Risk 
Index 
 
 
Log of Oil Revenue 
to GDP 
 
Log of Misery 
Index8 
 
 
 
Log of FDI to GDP 
Definition9 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. Source: The 
World Bank 
 
The indicator is sourced from Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Government Effectiveness. It is calculated according to the formula: 
Government Effectiveness/2.5*3+4. Source: Datastream, Oxford 
Economics 
 
Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production 
at world prices and total costs of production. Source: The World 
Bank 
 
The misery index is an economic indicator, created by economist 
Arthur Okun, and found by adding the unemployment rate to the 
inflation rate. Source: A The World Bank 
 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire 
a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in 
an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
Source: The World Bank 
 
In this paper, we investigate the dynamic linkages between growth and political risk after 
controlling for oil rent, foreign direct investment and misery index for 16 oil dependent OIC countries 
by taking 4-year average data during the period 1990–2011 using system-GMM model with an  
                                                             
8 Author’s calculation by using Inflation and Unemployment data from The World Bank 
9 For detailed definition see Appendix A 
 unbalanced panel data.10 Following Aisen, A., & Veiga, F. J. (2013) the empirical model is identified as 
a reduced form dynamic panel model of economic growth. Economic growth, log of per capita GDP 
constant USD (LPC) is described as a function of political risk (LPR), oil rent (LOR), misery index 
(LMI) and foreign direct investment to GDP(LFI). We take the logarithm of all variables in our model to 
reduce high variability.  
𝐿𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝐿𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖1𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝐿𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝐿𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      
Where i indicates the country (𝑖 = 1, … ,16) and t indicates the time period (𝑡 = 1996, … 2014). 
Methodology 
We have followed sequential steps to develop the econometric model which is appropriate for 
our study by considering nature of data and time span. For that, we started with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) at first to see the relationship between dependent and independent variables. However, there are 
certain econometric problems which arise while using OLS for estimating our equation. Firstly, as we 
use the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation, this variable is supposed to be 
endogenous and can lead to autocorrelation and time invariant country characteristics, fixed effects, may 
be also correlated with the other explanatory variables, consequently, OLS estimation gives us biased 
and inconsistent results. 
Then we run fixed effect estimator in order to compare result with the OLS estimation. Fixed 
effect imposes equality of all slope coefficients, both short and long run, and equality of error variances 
across units or countries in our case, and only the intercepts across countries are allowed to vary, which 
is considered as limitation of the fixed estimator. Moreover, fixed estimator is most appropriate for long 
time series panel data. In our case, we use 4-year average from 1996 to 2014, which means our T is 5. 
That limits us to use not only fixed effect but also such dynamic heterogeneous panel estimators as 
pooled mean group and mean group where many restrictions of fixed effect are relaxed however large T 
is required.  
By considering the limitation of OLS and fixed effect estimator, also, nature of our model and 
short time span induce us to use generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed for 
dynamic panel data that were first proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). They suggest the use of first 
differences of the variables to eliminate the fixed effects, which is also known as the Standard or 
                                                             
10 Data on the index of political risk and its components is available from 1996 for our sample . In order to avoid a great 
number of missing values in our sample, nearest neighbour interpolation was used to generate annual data. 
 Difference GMM. However, the problem of correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term remains, which requires the use of instruments. To solve this problem, Arellano and Bond  
(1991)use appropriate lags of dependent and independent variables as instruments. The lagged levels of 
regressors, independent variables, may be weak instruments for the differenced variables which cannot 
be addressed in difference estimator. More specifically, first difference GMM estimator behave poorly 
and lead to large sample biases when the independent variables are persistent over time (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). Finally, the absence of information about the focus variables in the level form can result in 
loss of a substantial part of total variance in the data (Arellano & Bover, 1995).  
To solve these above discussed problems with Difference GMM, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (Blundell & Bond, 1998) proposed System GMM estimator. This estimator 
combines in a system with the regression in first differences and with the regression in levels. To 
compute the system estimator, variables in differences are instrumented with the lags of their own 
levels, while variables in levels are instrumented with the lags of their own differences (Bond et al., 
(2009). In other words, the first differenced moment conditions in Difference GMM are augmented by 
level moment conditions in System GMM for more efficiency in estimation (Blundell & Bond, 1998). In 
the System GMM, even though the levels of the explanatory variables are essentially correlated with the 
country specific fixed effect, the differences are not correlated. In addition to that time dummies may be 
included to control for the time-specific effects and to eliminate cross-sectional dependence in the data 
and country or unit dummies may be used to control for the country specific or unit effects. One more 
argument in favor of using System GMM is that for unbalanced panel data it is better to use System 
GMM and avoid Difference GMM estimation, which has weakness of magnifying gaps (Roodman, 
2009b). 
However, simulations suggest that the System GMM is not necessarily superior to the Difference 
GMM in cases where the autoregressive parameter is below 0.8 and the time series observations are 
relatively large (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Moshirian & Wu, 2012). However, System GMM is more 
efficient if persistence criteria, the coefficient of lagged dependent variable, fall within lagged dependent 
variable of OLS and Fixed effect (Huang, 2010). 
While System GMM solves the above discussed problems, there exist two weaknesses. Though 
asymptotically more efficient, the two-step GMM carries out estimations of the standard errors that tend 
to be critically downward biased. However, it is possible to overcome this problem using the finite-
 sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005) which make two-
step robust GMM estimates more efficient than one-step robust one especially for the System GMM 
(Roodman, 2009b).  After specifying the Windmeijer correct (WC-robust) standard errors (without 
which simulation studies indicate the standard errors in the two-step estimation to be severely downward 
biased), Sargan test is not reported but Hansen J-test is applied for validating the instruments particularly 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
Too many instruments problem is the second weakness of GMM estimations. Roodman 
(2009a,b) develops a detailed analysis on this issue, emphasizing the symptoms of an excessive use of 
instruments. The idea is that as time dimension increases, the number of instruments can be too large 
compared to the sample size (number of units or groups), invalidating some asymptotic results and 
specification tests. Too many instruments can over fit endogenous variables and fail to wipe out their 
endogenous components, resulting in biased coefficients. Another argument is that the Hansen and 
difference-in-Hansen tests can be weak in the presence of overidentification. The system GMM 
estimation can follow two empirical strategies to deal with too many instruments (Roodman, 2009b). 
The first one is to use the ‘collapse’ sub option for the xtabond2 command in STATA. The idea is to 
combine instruments by adding smaller sets, without dropping any lags, meaning that there is the 
creation of one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, 
variable, and lag distance. The final outcome is to divide the GMM style moment conditions into groups 
and sum the conditions in each group to form a smaller set of conditions. At the end, we have a set of 
collapsed instruments where one is made for each lag distance, with zero substituted for any missing 
values. The second empirical strategy (lag limits) forces the use of only certain lags instead of all 
available lags as instruments. Both empirical choices have something in common, which is the reduction 
of the number of instruments and their linearity in T (Vieira, Holland, da Silva, & Bottecchia, 2013). In 
our study, we follow the second strategy.  
After analyzing various estimator and their pros and cons, it can be argued that by considering 
the nature of our panel data, System GMM is more likely to give better estimate than Difference GMM. 
We use the xtabond2 command (Roodman, 2009a) to run System GMM estimation in Stata 13.11 
However, we run OLS, Fixed effect and both the two-step difference and system GMM estimations for 
our panel data set. We follow up with post estimation specification tests, namely the Hansen J-test test 
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 for over-identifying restrictions after applying Weinjmier correction to correct the distortion of standard 
deviation, by using syntax robust in STATA and the Arellano-Bond (1991) test, AR(2), for no 
autocorrelation in the second-differenced errors. 
As our sample consists of countries with different level of economic, financial, social and 
political development, for example, three major categories in terms of income: high income, mid income 
and low income; also different type of political structure, and degree of oil dependence, consequently, 
standard least-squares assumption of normally distributed errors does not hold for our dataset because 
the values for per capita GDP and other independent variables follow a skewed distribution. This is 
because when there are evidences of outliers and heavy tailed distributions, quantile regression results 
are characteristically robust for such cases but standard OLS regression estimators are not robust even to 
the modest departure from normality. 
Furthermore, advantage is that, ‘‘while conventional regression focuses on the mean, quantile 
regressions are able to describe the entire conditional distribution of the dependent variable’’ (Coad & 
Rao, 2006). In the context of this study, high political stability or low political risk, high oil dependent 
and per capita GDP countries are of interest in their own right, we don’t want to remove from analysis 
just because they are outliers, but on the other side we strongly believe that it would be meaningful to 
study them in detail. But this can be done by calculating coefficient estimates at various quantiles of the 
conditional distribution by using quantile regression equation. Finally, as variable (Coad & Rao, 2006) 
documented ‘‘a quantile regression approach avoids the restrictive assumption that the error terms are 
identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribution’’. If we relax this assumption we will 
be able to acknowledge, to some extent, country heterogeneity and consider the opportunity that 
estimated slope parameters diverge at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of lower and 
higher per capita GDP. By following the quantile regression framework of Tiwari (2013) we try to 
investigate whether different stages of economic growth are affected by our focused and control 
variables.  
The quantile regression model in the framework of Koenker and Bassett (1978) can be written as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ?́?𝑖𝑡𝛽0 + 𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃((𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = ?́?𝑖𝑡𝛽0,      (1) 
Where i denotes country, t denotes time, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  denotes is the dependent variables, ?́?𝑖𝑡  is a vector of 
regressors, 𝛽  is the vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝜀  is vector of residuals. 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃((𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) 
 denotes 𝜃𝑡ℎ conditional quantile of  𝑦𝑖𝑡  given 𝑥𝑖𝑡 . 𝜃𝑡ℎ  regression quantile, 0 < 𝜃 < 1 , solves the 
following problem: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝛽
1
𝑛
{ ∑ 𝜃
𝑖,𝑡:𝑦𝑖𝑡>?́?𝑖𝑡𝛽
│𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?́?𝑖𝑡𝛽│ + ∑ (1 − 𝜃)
𝑖,𝑡:𝑦𝑖𝑡< ?́?𝑖𝑡𝛽
│𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?́?𝑖𝑡𝛽│} =
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝛽
1
𝑛
∑ 𝜌𝜃𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
     (2) 
Where 𝜌𝜃(∙), which is known as the ‘check function’, is defined as”: 
𝜌𝜃(𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡) = {
𝜃𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡
(𝜃 − 1)𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡
     
𝑖𝑓𝜃𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0
𝑖𝑓𝜃𝜀𝜃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 0
}          (3) 
Finally Eq. (2) is solved by linear programming methods. According to Buchinsky (1998), as one 
increases 𝜃 continuously from 0 to 1, one traces the entire conditional distribution of yit, conditional on 
xit. 
Due to the advantages (as stated above) of quantile regression estimation technique over OLS, fixed and 
random effect models, in the study we examined at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles as shown 
here: 
𝑄0.05(𝐿𝑃𝐶) = 𝛼0.05 + 𝛽0.05,1𝐿𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽0.05,2𝐿𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽0.05,3𝐿𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽0.05,4𝐿𝐹𝐼 + 𝜀0.05𝑖𝑡 
𝑄0.25(𝐿𝑃𝐶) = 𝛼0.25 + 𝛽0.25,1𝐿𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽0.25,2𝐿𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽0.25,3𝐿𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽0.25,4𝐿𝐹𝐼 + 𝜀0.25𝑖𝑡 
𝑄0.50(𝐿𝑃𝐶) = 𝛼0.50 + 𝛽0.50,1𝐿𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽0.50,2𝐿𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽0.50,3𝐿𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽0.50,4𝐿𝐹𝐼 + 𝜀0.50𝑖𝑡 
𝑄0.75(𝐿𝑃𝐶) = 𝛼0.75 + 𝛽0.75,1𝐿𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽0.75,2𝐿𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽0.75,3𝐿𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽0.75,4𝐿𝐹𝐼 + 𝜀0.75𝑖𝑡 
𝑄0.95(𝐿𝑃𝐶) = 𝛼0.95 + 𝛽0.95,1𝐿𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽0.95,2𝐿𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽0.95,3𝐿𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽0.95,4𝐿𝐹𝐼 + 𝜀0.95𝑖𝑡 
We used sqreg module of Stat 13 for simultaneous quantile regression estimation with baseline OLS and 
fixed and random effect (see appendix).  
Empirical results and analysis 
We start our analysis with descriptive statistics (Table 1) for 16 OIC countries (Appendix B). It shows 
clearly that per capita GDP (LPC) has the highest standard deviation followed by misery index (LMI). 
This indicates how different these 16 countries are in terms of income, macroeconomic stability and 
degree of dependence on oil rent. Political risk also differs across countries which are measured in the 
scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represent very high political risk (political instability) and 7 represent very low 
political risk (political stability).   
 
 Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
       LPC 8.574 8.477 5.988 11.033 1.437 0.013 1.829 
LPR 1.649 1.621 1.180 1.991 0.211 -0.101 1.967 
LOR 3.046 3.182 0.032 4.158 0.804 -1.352 4.987 
LMI -2.288 -2.075 -4.936 -0.404 0.999 -0.575 2.818 
LFI 2.165 2.146 1.630 2.914 0.252 0.734 3.491 
 
Figure.1. shows that per capita GDP (Fig.1.a) of 16 countries had decreased from 1996 till 2007 before 
it decreased significantly since then. From 1996 the political risk (Fig.1.b) had increased gradually and 
reached at peak in 2008-2011, so called “Arab Spring” are the consequences in MENA regions.  In the 
period of 2004-2007 oil revenue to GDP (Fig.1.c)  reached at the top when the oil price, West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) crude oil increased to all time at$147.27 per barrel. The oil revenue has been 
declining with the falling oil price since then. Misery Index (Fig.1.d), aggregate of inflation and 
unemployment, shows that even though it declined greatly from the period 1996-1999 to 200-2003 but 
increased dramatically afterwards and remained somewhat stable. In a recent report published in 
Bloomberg Business indicates that Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia suffer from both high 
inflation and unemployment and falling oil price is one of the key factors behind this (Popina, 2016). 
FDI to GDP (Fig.1.e) remained somewhat stable only increased slightly in the period of 2004-2007, that 
is pre-global financial crisis. From the figure 1, we can see that there is a similar trend among the 
variables. 
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Fig.1. Trend in variables   
Table 2 
Correlation matrix                                                      
                 LPC          LPR          LOR          LMI          LFI    
LPC                1                                                        
LPR            0.754***         1                                           
LOR            0.372**     -0.109            1                              
LMI           -0.758***    -0.739***    -0.141            1                 
LFI           0.0111        0.171      -0.0258      0.00685            1    
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The correlation matrix (Table 2) shows that correlations among the variables. Most of the 
correlation coefficients are below 0.80 which confirms that the possibility of having multicollinearity 
problem is very low. Political risk (LPR) is positively correlated with the economic growth and highly 
significant. This indicates higher political stability induces economic growth of oil dependent OIC 
countries. Oil rent (LOR) is also found significantly correlated with the growth. This is evident as we 
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 have selected those OIC countries as oil dependent when oil revenue to GDP is 5% or above. Economic 
growth (LPC) exhibits the highest correlation with the misery index (LMI) and relationship is negative 
which supports the theory, increase in inflation and unemployment reduces growth.  
  
 Table 3 
Base Models and GMM for OIC oil dependent countries 
Dependent variable: Log of Per Capita GDP 
 
                                OLSa     Fixeda     DifGMMa     SysGMMa    SysGMMb 
          Effect 
  
L.Per Capita GDP              0.905+     0.791+     0.869+     0.798+     0.837+ 
                             [0.02]     [0.10]     [0.22]     [0.07]     [0.07]  
Political Risk                0.108      0.681      0.368      0.601*     0.582  
                             [0.16]     [0.48]     [0.85]     [0.28]     [0.45]  
Oil Revenue to GDP            0.038     -0.041     -0.026      0.121-     0.034  
                             [0.03]     [0.08]     [0.10]     [0.06]     [0.06]  
Misery Index                 -0.051-    -0.004     -0.004     -0.073-    -0.006  
                             [0.03]     [0.04]     [0.05]     [0.04]     [0.05]  
FDI to GDP                    0.144*     0.092      0.109      0.111     -0.003  
                             [0.06]     [0.10]     [0.10]     [0.08]     [0.04]  
Constant                      0.151      0.644                -0.004      0.341  
                             [0.20]     [1.18]                [0.28]     [0.34]  
 
R-Squared    0.995 
Prob>F    0.000      0.000 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.994 
Observations                     60         60         44         60        104  
Instruments                                             7         13         13  
Number of Groups                            16         16         16         27 
Arellano-Bond: AR(1)         0.087    0.154   0.252 
Arellano-Bond: AR(2)                                0.377      0.826      0.250  
Hansen test (p-val)                                 0.080      0.496      0.086  
 
 Notes:   
a Regression for 16 OIC oil-dependent countries 
b System GMM for 27 OIC and non-OIC oil dependent countries 
- Syntax for xtabond2 twostep small robust 
- Model SysGMM indicates coefficient lies in between OLS and Fixed effect model and very 
close to 0.80 
- Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance level of T-statistics are shown as - p<0.1, * 
p<0.05, + p<0.01 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 
2000, correction), so Hansen test is reported rather than Sargan test and Hansen tests never reject 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected. 
 
The estimation results of the model described in the previous section using the method system-
GMM for linear dynamic panel data models are shown in Table 3. The dependent variable is the log of 
per capita GDP (LPC) and the explanatory variables are in the log form as well.  First of all, we run 
ordinary least squares (OLS) where R-square is 0.995 and p-value is significant which indicates the 
model is correct, however,  our focus variable political risk is not significant but show expected positive 
sign and oil revenue to GDP also shows positive sign but not statistically significant. At the same time 
misery index and FDI to GDP are statistically significant at 10% and 5% level respectively. As expected 
misery index is found to be negatively correlated with the economic growth which supports the theory. 
To further elaborate, one percent increase in Misery Index would lead to decrease in economic growth 
by 0.05%  after controlling for other variables.  
In the next model, we run fixed effect regression, which is considered as the most restrictive of 
all and imposes equality of all slope coefficients i.e. both short and long run and equality of error 
variance across units or countries, and only the intercepts across units or countries are allowed to vary, 
for the same variables. As the fixed effect column results indicate none of the independent variables is 
significant except lagged dependent variable.  
Even though, the time period is very short (T=5) in our sample study, we run difference or 
standard GMM to compare our result across different models. The result shows that lagged dependent 
 variable is significant and coefficient is above 0.80 but none of the variables are statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of oil revenue to GDP became negative as in the fixed effect model, which 
means increase in oil revenue to GDP would decrease GDP. The result is very counter intuitive as our 
sample consists of countries where oil revenue to GDP is above 5% and it is well documented in the 
literature that these countries rely heavily on oil revenue and has positive effect on growth. The 
coefficient of misery index remains negative. On top of that, the model seems accurate as instruments 
are less than the number of groups but we loss some observations due to first differencing of the 
variables. Moreover, we failed to reject the null hypothesis of Hansen test: Over-identifying restrictions 
are valid.  Finally, there is no second order autocorrelation problem. In brief, difference GMM shows 
some interesting result but due to limitations describe in the methodology we cannot proceed with this 
model. 
The fourth model of table 1, system GMM, exhibits comprehensive result. Starting with 
persistency parameter, coefficient of lagged dependent variable is statistically significant and very close 
to 0.80, moreover, which lies in between OLS and Fixed effect model. That’s why we can say the first 
criteria for applying system GMM is fulfilled. Secondly, number of instruments are less than number of 
groups. AR(2) and Hansen-J test show that there is no autocorrelation problem and over-identifying 
restrictions problem. Therefore, we can proceed with the explanation of the results found in the model. 
The results reported in the Table 3 column four (Sys GMM) confirm the hypothesis that political 
stability leads to higher economic growth, and show that effects are sizeable: additional one percent 
increase in political stability would increase the economic growth by 0.6% after controlling for other 
variables.  Oil revenue is statistically significant at 10% level and sign of coefficient is positive as 
expected. That explains, if oil revenue to GDP increase by one percent increase, the economic growth 
would increase by 0.12% assuming ceteris paribus. One of the key macroeconomic variables, misery 
index which combines inflation and employment is also statistically significant at 10% level and sign of 
coefficient is negative. It means one percent increase in misery index would lead to decrease in 
economic growth by 0.07% while controlling other independent variables. Interestingly, FDI to GDP is 
found not statistically significant but the sign and size of coefficient remain consistent across first four 
models. 
  
   
By taking all oil dependent developing countries (Appendix A), in order to investigate the 
relationship between the political risk and economic growth, we run the fifth regression. The results 
show that when we add 11 non-OIC countries, mostly OPEC member countries, even though the model 
remains viable but the coefficients have become insignificant and interestingly the effect of FDI to GDP 
is negative but the magnitude is very insignificant. In other words, increase in FDI to GDP would 
decrease economic growth. One possible explanation could be that most of these countries face 
institutional inefficiency, lack of infrastructure, poor property rights, rampant corruption and low 
political stability which deter foreign direct investment in the first place, even though some foreign 
investment come they are not properly invested in productive sectors which can boost output.  
To sum up findings of Table 3, we can argue that political stability and oil revenue plays a 
significant role in economic growth of oil dependent OIC countries. It can be argued that heavy 
dependence on oil revenue can hamper economic growth in the long run if the oil price goes down 
significantly. As recently the oil price has fallen below $30 per barrel, many of these countries have 
started to face economic vulnerability. The increase in government budget deficit and decrease in 
government spending further weaken the growth. Exchange rate and oil price are highly correlated 
unless they are pegged against USD or EUR for most of the oil dependent economies in OIC and non-
OIC. When the oil price goes down exchange rate depreciates. The recent trend in Russia, Nigeria, 
Malaysia and other OPEC member countries reconfirm this phenomenon.  Depreciation in real exchange 
rate further dampens the output through exchange rate channel. In this scenario, even though oil export 
revenue remains intact some degree increase in local currency but the import cost goes up and not 
surprisingly most of the oil dependent countries rely heavily on import. Consequently, inflation goes up, 
if inflation goes up, interest rate also increases which would discourage investment activities, less 
economic activity means more unemployment and ultimately fall in consumption and output.   
Table 4 introduces interaction variables in order to examine the various channels through which 
economic growth may be affected by political stability and other control variables. The diagnostic tests 
show that all 4 models are correctly specified and no problem with instruments proliferation, 
autocorrelation and over-identifying restrictions.  
 
  
Table 4 
System GMM using interaction variables for OIC oil dependent countries 
Dependent variable: Log of Per Capita GDP 
 
                                (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)        (5)  
 
L.Per Capita GDP              0.798+     0.818+     0.799+     0.799+     0.818+ 
                             [0.07]     [0.07]     [0.05]     [0.06]     [0.11]  
Political Risk                0.601*     1.482-     0.527      0.520*     2.532* 
                             [0.28]     [0.82]     [0.54]     [0.23]     [1.19]  
Oil Revenue to GDP            0.121-     0.106-     0.093      0.088      0.458  
                             [0.06]     [0.05]     [0.26]     [0.07]     [0.37]  
Misery Index                 -0.073-    -0.059     -0.077-    -0.033      0.162  
                             [0.04]     [0.04]     [0.04]     [0.11]     [0.20]  
FDI to GDP                    0.111      0.852      0.118      0.119      1.134  
                             [0.08]     [0.63]     [0.09]     [0.08]     [0.86]  
PRxFI                                   -0.430                           -0.579  
                                        [0.36]                           [0.48]  
ORxPR                                               0.015                -0.307  
                                                   [0.14]                [0.25]  
ORxPRxMI                                                      -0.008     -0.040  
                                                              [0.01]     [0.03]  
Constant                     -0.004     -1.605      0.103      0.201     -2.920  
                             [0.28]     [1.42]     [0.84]     [0.36]     [1.97]  
 
Observations                     60         60         60         60         60  
Instruments                      13         14         14         14         13  
Number of Groups                 16         16         16         16         16  
Arellano-Bond: AR(1)   0.154      0.117      0.116      0.116      0.154 
 Arellano-Bond: AR(2)          0.826      0.858      0.803      0.760      0.775  
Hansen test (p-val)           0.496      0.437      0.470      0.481      0.186  
 
Notes: -Syntax for xtabond2 twostep small robust 
- Model SysGMM indicates coefficient lies in between OLS and Fixed effect model and very 
close to 0.80 
a Regression for 16 OIC oil-dependent countries 
b System GMM for 27 OIC and non-OIC oil dependent countries 
- Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance level of T-statistics are shown as - p<0.1, * 
p<0.05, + p<0.01 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 
2000, correction), so Hansen test is reported rather than Sargan test and Hansen tests never reject 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected. 
 
In the second model (Table 4), when we add political risk and FDI to GDP dummy (PRxFI) the 
impact of political risk doubles on economic growth. Even though the dummy itself is not statistically 
significant but it shows the correct sign which is negative. This explains, increase in political instability 
decreases foreign direct investment and consequently economic growth declines. This channel is quite 
interesting in a sense that even though FDI to GDP do not play a very significant role for these countries 
as we have discussed in the previous paragraph but its magnitude has increased after the addition of 
dummy. There is no significant difference in impact of oil revenue to GDP but misery index has become 
insignificant with decrease in coefficient.  
To examine, oil revenue and political risk channel, we included this dummy (ORxPR) in the 
third model. After including dummy, political risk becomes insignificant and coefficient has come back 
almost to previous level and oil revenue to GDP also has become statistically insignificant. The Dummy 
explains only 0.01% change due to change political risk through oil revenue assuming ceteris paribus. 
However, we may observe increase in political instability in many of these countries.  In the model 4, 
when interact oil revenue to GDP, political risk and misery index (ORxPRxMI), we still observe 
political stability is significant and magnitude remains same, one percent increase in political stability 
would increase growth by0.52% by controlling for other variables. Moreover, coefficient of oil revenue 
 to GDP increased but not statistically significant. Interestingly, misery index become insignificant, this 
may be due to addition of interaction term.  
In the fifth and final model, when include all dummy variables in the system of equation, we 
observe that political stability still remains statistically significant at 5% significance level and 
magnitude has increase many fold, one percent increase in political risk would increase the economic 
growth by 2.5% while other variables remain constant. Even though remaining control variables have 
become insignificant but the magnitude of coefficient increased. One major change noticeable in this 
model is the change in sign of misery index. This may be due to inclusion of all interactive dummies 
together as expectedly sign of all interactive dummies are negative but not statistically significant.  
Impact of political stability on economic growth through quantile regression 
At this point of our study, it is quite interesting to study the effect of political stability on 
economic growth for countries with different level of economic development. As our sample consists of 
high income, medium and low income countries, we cannot really expect to see the impact of political 
stability on economic growth equally. Figure 2 shows the matrix of scatter plots for all variables and it 
shows that most of the cases we might face heteroskedasticity problem. In order to overcome that, we 
take the help of simultaneous quantile regression12 as discussed earlier in the methodology section.  
                                                             
12 Table of simultaneous quantile regressions are presented in Appendix E 
  
Fig.2.Matrix of scatter plots 
Figure 3 shows that the effect of selected variables on economic growth may vary from quantile 
to quantile. The horizontal line indicates beta of OLS and dotted lines show the confidence interval. If 
the betas of quantile regression fall outside the confidence interval, they are statistically significantly 
different from the betas of OLS regression. The shaded area is the confidence interval of the betas in 
quantile regression. 
  
Fig.3. Simultaneous quantile regression on oil dependent OIC countries 
For country with lower per capita GDP i.e. below 25% quantiles (Fig.3.a), the impact of political 
stability on economic growth is higher. On the contrary, for countries with higher per capita GDP e.g. 
above 50% quantiles (Fig.3.a), the impact of political stability on economic growth is lower. It is shown 
that the difference is statistically significant as betas for lower and higher quantiles lie outside the area 
of OLS confidence interval.    
The impact of oil revenue to GDP on economic growth does not differ significantly across 
different quantiles except for lower effect on higher quantiles (Fig.3.b). However, it is visible that for 
lower quantiles the impact of oil revenue to GDP on economic growth is higher compare to higher 
quantiles (above 75% quantiles).  
When we look at misery index, at lower quantile there is no significant difference but from 25% 
to 75% quantiles (Fig.3.c), the impact of misery index is lower on economic growth and statistically 
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 significant. Interestingly, for foreign direct investment to GDP there is no significant difference across 
different quantiles except at 5% quantiles (Fig.3.d), where impact on economic growth is lower. 
Conclusion and Policy implications  
Although all the findings of the study are robust but we must acknowledge the limited scope of 
the study by considering the time limitation, as well the number of cross section units is sixteen which 
might cause bias estimates due to normality assumption. Also inclusion of Islamic variables, 
development of Islamic banking and capital markets, institutional variables, property rights, corruption, 
rule of law, good governance, could have been more appropriate but availability of data is the main 
obstacle. The conclusions drawn from the study are more general and suggestive than specific and 
prescriptive.  
It can be argued that the political stability and growth is one of the fundamental principles 
mentioned in the Holy Quran and traditions of the Prophet (PBUH).  Theoretical and empirical 
literatures confirm our hypothesis. Our analysis shows that political stability even plays more important 
role in economic growth of OIC countries under the backdrop of multiple wars, invasion, ethnic 
violence, military coups, revolutions and recent Arab springs. Our study fill the gap in existing literature 
by studying political stability and growth in oil dependent OIC countries by including two political risk 
indicators not usually used in the existing literatures. Moreover, we apply two advanced econometric 
methodologies: system GMM and simultaneous quantile regression to test our hypothesis.  
The results of the system GMM estimators strongly confirm that political stability significantly 
affect economic growth of oil dependent OIC countries. As expected oil revenue contributes 
significantly in growth and also statistically significant. Misery index, unemployment plus inflation, is 
significant and have negative impact on growth. Most of the low to mid income oil dependent OIC 
countries suffer from chronic higher inflation and unemployment and consequently it has significant 
negative effect on growth However, foreign direct investment is found not significant determinant of 
economic growth. The results of quantile regression indicate that political stability is more important for 
lower income countries than higher income countries. The impact of oil revenue on economic growth 
remains stable for all countries. However, for low to mid income countries higher unemployment and 
inflation do affect growth negatively. No significant difference is found for FDI to GDP across different 
quantiles
 From the above discussed findings, we can argue that political stability is one of the most 
important determinants of economic growth for oil dependent OIC countries. Too much dependence on 
oil revenue makes most of these economies vulnerable to increase oil price volatility. Recent decrease in 
oil price has put tremendous pressure on oil exporting countries.  Oil dependence and political stability 
could be interconnected and could affect economic growth. For example, decreasing oil revenue will 
increase budget deficit, consequently, decrease government spending. Government expenditures play a 
major role in these economies, so government would like to collect more revenue by imposing tax but 
for example in GCC countries there are no well-developed taxation system. In addition to that most of 
these countries suffer from huge budget deficit, for example in 2015 estimates show that budget deficit 
is 18.8% of GDP for Saudi Arabia, 49.3% for Libya, 11.2% for Algeria, 10.8% for Oman, 15.4% for 
Iraq, and 3.6% for Malaysia.13 In this situation, when the government starts to reduce subsidies, tax 
people, disposable income will decline which will reduce consumption and consequently output. More 
dangerously, frustration among many young populations would grow up as unemployment is likely to 
increase with higher inflation, stagflation, and in a recent article by Bloomberg (Popina, 2016) shows 
unemployment and inflation are very high in many OIC countries.  Our study confirms that average 
political stability is average to very low for oil dependent OIC countries. It has been evident in recent 
Arab springs in many of our sample countries. While analyzing the root causes of “Arab Spring” it is 
clear that political instability has aggravated after long period of economic repression, inequality, 
unemployment, and high inflation and tyrannical autocratic leaders failed to control the situation.  
In order to maintain sustainable growth and overcome the so called resource curse, oil dependent 
countries need to diversify their economy and develop non-oil tradable export sectors. Therefore, 
governments need to change incentive structure, develop local industry and financial markets in order to 
encourage entrepreneurial activities and generate more sustainable employment. To control excessive 
inflation, central banks in OIC countries should maintain stable growth in money supply, as World Bank 
data shows most of the OIC countries have excessive money supply growth. As evidently, persistent 
higher inflation and unemployment make people’s life more difficult. Most of the population in OIC 
countries is young, if these young people are unemployed, they would easily involve with popular 
uprising like Arab spring which ultimate won’t bring any good for greater well-being of people and the 
economy. 
                                                             
13 CIA, The World FactBook 
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